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Europe in the World Programme 
 
Building EU foreign policy over the past twenty years has been one of 
the most challenging and difficult aspects of the process of integration 
and, despite the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the policy 
is still far from meeting the expectations of European citizens and of the 
rest of the world. At the same time, the EU’s role in international politics 
is being challenged both politically and economically. The rise of new 
powers, an increasingly fluid system of global governance, and the 
growing internationalisation of domestic politics and policies are all 
putting the EU under the spotlight to deliver. 
The EPC’s Europe in the World Programme takes a dual approach. EU 
capabilities in foreign policy and its political will to play a role as a global 
actor are essential to understand the ways in which the Union engages 
with the world, by analysing the External Action Service, the use of the 
EU’s foreign policy tool box, and political dynamics in Europe. Through 
seminars, public events, and special projects, the Programme also 
examines the EU’s ‘performance’ in certain parts of the world (especially 
in the Balkans and in the EU’s neighbourhood, but also in Asia) while 
addressing thematic and cross-cutting issues, such as foreign policy and 
international migration, international justice, human rights, crisis 
management and peacebuilding. 
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Foreword 
 
 
Multilateralism is more difficult in an age of increased competition for dwindling resources between 
a growing number of global actors. But that is not a reason to give up on it. Quite the contrary: this 
is why multilateralism is even more important now than in 2003, when the European Union (EU) put 
forward ‘effective multilateralism’ as a key objective in the European Security Strategy.  
 
To start with, any war involving one of the great powers would be disastrous for Europe’s vital 
interests, even if Europe itself would not be a party to the conflict. The more the great powers are 
engaged in multilateral cooperation, the more predictability and stability there will be in their 
relations. But Europeans are conscious of the imperfections of the current multilateral system: 
they are often over-represented, at the expense of the emerging powers, and certain policy areas 
lack institutions with the necessary competences and the power to enforce them. Europe ought 
to actively try and shape reform of the system, rather than cede the initiative to others. The 
examples of Russia’s project for a Eurasian Union and of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
demonstrate that the desire to have a ‘no westerners allowed’ club is insufficient to create a 
purposive and performing multilateral organisation. In 2015 China opted for an alternative road 
and invited western countries to join the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank that it set up. 
Europeans accepted the invitation, thus buying a say in decision-making and ensuring that the new 
bank contributes to, rather than detracts from, effective multilateralism. 
 
But the fact remains that many of the emerging powers adhere to the multilateralism of 1945: 
multilateral bodies as fora where the powers meet to settle their problems, rather than as 
institutions with powers in their own right. Europeans, formed by their own experience of EU 
integration, of course have a much more ambitious view of strong multilateral institutions that can 
impose binding rules. But the emerging powers do not agree among themselves; the BRICS for 
example have demonstrated their differences more often than their accord. Fortunately, for it 
would be very disadvantageous were the BRICS to be consolidated as a firm anti-western grouping. 
At the same time, many deplore Europe’s suivisme vis-à-vis the US’s TTIP initiative, which together 
with its Pacific counterpart, TTP, seeks to organise the world on a US-centred basis that excludes 
China. Are we sure that this will make multilateralism more effective? 
 
The EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Strategy that will replace the 2003 strategy at the 
end of June 2016 could outline which priority areas multilateralism needs to become more 
effective, by creating new institutions or reinforcing existing ones. Europe should then use its 
bilateral strategic partnerships to forge ad hoc coalitions in different issue areas and work with 
different sets of countries wherever interests coincide, for example on maritime security, on 
environmental problems, or on social affairs. Multilateral cooperation can yet be made to work.  
 
 
Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop 
Director, Europe in the World Programme, Egmont Institute 
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Introduction – The EU Global Strategy and Multilateralism 
 
Balazs Ujvari 
 
In an age of unprecedented global interdependence and connectivity, no country or regional entity 
can play a leading role in international policy-making without a proactive multilateral agenda. The 
European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 made tentative steps towards equipping the European 
Union (EU) with such an agenda: the document expressed a commitment to building an 
‘International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism.’ This ‘effective multilateralism’ doctrine 
of the EU, which essentially amounted to  support for legally binding commitments agreed upon 
by the largest number of nations possible through strong multilateral institutions, has nonetheless 
fallen short of defining  international relations of the past decade. While policy-making via 
universal deals has endured in certain domains such as climate change, decision-making in other 
areas has tended to shift to plurilateral or bilateral fora. This has notably been the case with regard 
to trade and development policy where the landscape is characterised by an increasing number of 
parallel structures (regional multilateral development banks) and initiatives (mega-regional free 
trade agreements). In addition, while the ESS did specify how the EU should act on the 
international stage, it failed to specify on which policy areas the Union should focus  doing so, 
leaving its multilateral agenda too generic and devoid of priorities.   
 
Arguably, the ongoing consultation process on the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) presents 
an occasion for the Union to redress the ESS’s shortcomings and update its stance on multilateralism. 
As rule-based multilateralism remains deeply entrenched in the Union’s DNA, the EUGS is unlikely 
to represent ground-breaking innovations as to how the EU should act in international affairs.  As 
Alyson Bailes puts it, the EU’s ‘deepest interest lies in making others – and eventually the world – 
more like itself.’1 Accordingly, the EU’s preferred approach to operating internationally would 
continue to be through formal institutions. Yet, the feasibility of proceeding in such a way across all 
domains of international policy making – as may have been wished for by the ESS of 2003 – is 
increasingly questionable. As a result, the EU’s approach to multilateralism will have to be more 
flexible, giving room to other forms of multilateralism such as ad hoc coalitions, minilateral formats, 
strategic partnerships and transnational networks at the detriment of formal institutions.2 
 
With the EUGS focusing on foreign – rather than just security – policy, thus covering a diverse  
set of policy areas (foreign, security, trade, development, energy, and climate), the key challenge 
in respect of the EU’s multilateralism is twofold. The first challenge lies in setting out clear  
priorities for the EU’s multilateral action to be pursued collectively by the member states; and the 
second in determining the form of multilateralism that would best suit the promotion of the 
priorities concerned.  
 
  
                                                          
1 A. Bailes, External Security Policies and the European model, in L. Tsoukalis (ed.), The EU in a World in Transition: Fit for what 
purpose?, Policy Network 2009, p. 34. 
2 G. Grevi, EU Global Strategy Expert Opnion 26., European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2016. 
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This report aims to feed into the EUGS debate specifically on the upgrade of the EU’s stance on 
multilateralism by presenting different points of view on what should be the focus of the EU’s 
multilateral agenda in the coming years – whether it be thematic or geographic. The report 
includes six contributions from policy analysts and academics – each an expert in their respective 
areas – who were asked to answer the following question in a concise fashion:  
 
Over a five year horizon, what do you think should be the focus of the EU’s multilateral agenda? 
 
Contributors were given free rein to highlight a particular policy area, a certain region or a key 
third country. For Juliane Schmidt (The EU’s Multilateralism as Proactive Engagement), a priority 
of the EU’s multilateral action should be about providing an adequate response to the rise of 
(re)emerging powers such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the 
multilateral structures they create to increase their influence in international affairs. The Union, 
she argues, must reflect on where its interests lie faced with an increased fragmentation of the 
multilateral system and the rise of emerging powers. She suggests that EU member states must 
support continuing reform of established international organisations to better reflect the changing 
realities of the present day while also critically assessing new multilateral bodies in terms of how 
they fit the EU’s own approach to multilateralism. 
 
According to Alice Ekman (A Multilateral Agenda for the EU: Taking China’s Activism into Account), 
the EU’s multilateral agenda must focus specifically on China and its increased assertiveness  
on the international stage. In order to challenge the established global governance system  
and increase its voice on the international stage, she suggests China will be a key source of 
initiatives in the foreseeable future. Not only will Beijing seek to better integrate into existing 
institutions, but it will also create its own formal and informal multilateral structures and 
mechanisms while also reinvigorating neglected ones. Faced with this multidimensional challenge 
emanating from China, EU member states should act in concert to exert the largest influence 
possible on these developments. 
 
Joren Selleslaghs (Improved Multilateral Action through the Revitalisation of EU-Latin 
America Relations) shifts the emphasis towards Latin America, highlighting the importance of the 
region for the EU’s multilateral action. Describing EU relations with the region as being largely 
unexploited, he asserts that an intensified and broader cooperation with Latin American countries 
could result in more support for the EU’s multilateral agenda from the region.  A revitalised EU-
Latin America relationship, he argues, should rest on four main pillars: (i) The pursuit of mutual 
benefits in development policy, (ii) An increased focus on research and development matters, (iii) 
An enhanced cooperation in crisis management operations and, (iv) The strengthening of the inter-
regional dimension of the relationship. 
 
Breaking with the geographical focus of the first four contributions, Luk Van Langenhove 
(Multilateral EU Action through Science Diplomacy) provides an insight into how the EU – a world 
leader in scientific research and innovation – could enhance its effectiveness in the multilateral 
arena by making better use of its science diplomacy in the realm of foreign policy. He argues 
science diplomacy could add value to EU action on the global stage particularly with regard to its 
role as a regional security actor, commercial power and frontrunner in addressing global 
challenges such as climate change, energy and food security, and societal issues). Van Langenhove 
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concludes that the ongoing EUGS process should be seized upon to raise the profile of science 
diplomacy in EU foreign policy thinking.   
 
According to Gerald Stang (The EU on the Multilateral Stage: Building a Global Energy and Climate 
Community), the Union’s multilateral agenda should focus on the creation of a ‘Global Energy and 
Climate Community’ building on the example of the EU’s own Energy Union. In promoting this 
objective, he suggest the EU should act through the existing set of multilateral mechanisms and 
bodies dealing with the energy-climate nexus and ensure that these structures are all driven by a 
common central vision.  Successful EU leadership on this project will hinge on the Union’s ability 
to incentivise partner countries with diverse energy challenges to decouple economic growth from 
carbon use, from energy importers such as China to energy exporters including Russia. 
 
Beatrice Berton (Countering Terrorism through Proactive Multilateral Action) argues that the 
domain where the EU most crucially needs a strengthened multilateral agenda is that of counter-
terrorism. Such an agenda, she suggests, should rest on three concrete pillars: (i) Building 
consensus around a globally applicable definition of terrorism, (ii) Consistently pushing for the 
implementation of UN resolutions on counter-terrorism through the EU’s bilateral relations, and 
(iii) Negotiating specific partnerships on counter-terrorism with third states, regional and sub-
regional actors while involving civil society organisations in the process to the largest extent 
possible. Led by these objectives, the main challenge for the EU, Breton concludes, will lie in 
addressing the different approaches to counter-terrorism that stem from differing democratic 
values, threat perceptions and priorities. 
 
 
Balazs Ujvari is a Joint Research Fellow at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International 
Relations and the European Policy Centre. He is also a Guest Lecturer at the College of Europe, 
the Free University of Brussels and the Vesalius College.  
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The EU’s Multilateralism as Proactive Engagement 
 
Juliane Schmidt 
 
The established multilateral system – especially the United Nations (UN) system and the Bretton 
Woods institutions – has been under strain from a shift towards newer, more flexible platforms 
that better represent modern geopolitical realities. Within this context, the European Union (EU) 
is working on a Global Strategy (EUGS) which will also include components on its role in multilateral 
fora. While its concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ still has significance today, the EU needs to 
become more proactive in engaging with others in order to reach this goal. 
 
Emerging powers in particular are disillusioned with the current system of multilateralism; not only 
are important initiatives stagnating due to blockage, but the established institutions do not provide 
them with appropriate representation. Considering this frustration, the EU’s multilateral agenda, 
in the coming years, must centre on developing a strategy for engagement with third countries, as 
well as with old and new international organisations in order to inspire vision and drive progress. 
 
Engage with other countries, especially emerging powers 
 
Global power dynamics have shifted in the current geopolitical environment. However, established 
multilateral institutions remain slow to recognise this shift through its seats and votes, as they are 
still modelled on the post-war system and based on Western ideas and notions. The long-lasting 
deadlock of the 2010 decision to rebalance votes and quota of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the lack of coordinated reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to achieve more equal 
representation of the world’s great powers represent the two most striking examples. Among 
emerging powers, IMF reform works particularly in favour of the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China), because they will now be among the 10 largest IMF members, whereas especially 
India and Brazil stand to benefit from a UNSC reform, as they form part of the (so far) most 
coordinated group, the G4 (along with Japan and Germany), advocating for permanent seats in the 
UNSC and mutually supporting each other’s bids. 
 
Not only do the institutions and their members need to adapt to modern circumstances, but so 
does the EU. For too long, the EU has relied on ‘leading by example’, expecting other countries to 
follow and support its initiatives, But that is not enough anymore. Not only have emerging powers 
gained international influence, but the EU has also lost power and leverage vis-à-vis other 
countries, as the geopolitical focus is shifting away from Europe and towards Asia, and the EU is 
struggling with several crises which undermine its ability to act on the international scene and 
damage its reputation and credibility. In this new environment, complacency must be replaced by 
engagement and cooperation with emerging powers on an equal footing.  
 
While the EU is often seen as a weak actor in an international setting but wants to be treated as a 
global player, many emerging powers also feel they do not receive the esteem they deserve 
considering their growing economic or political power, for example, India is the world’s largest 
democracy. Respect is a two-way street and starts with the recognition that equal partners can 
achieve more together, if they treat each other as such. 
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Getting emerging powers on board in multilateral institutions is essential for the EU’s present 
approach of ‘effective multilateralism.’ The EU envisions a system of global governance led by 
multilateral organisations and international law by rendering these organisations more effective 
in their functioning. However, emerging powers, especially China, have completely different ideas 
and concepts of multilateralism. Frustrated with the stagnation in development and decision-
making of existing Western-led institutions, they are increasingly working on new ones. 
 
The EU needs to think strategically about how it can cooperate with third countries, especially 
emerging powers, to their mutual benefit. Where do their interests overlap? What can the EU or 
the international community offer to those countries? And most importantly, why should they 
work with the EU in the established system of global governance? Reforming global institutions is 
about listening to and incorporating the interests of major stakeholders, to which emerging 
powers now belong. Western countries in general need to recognise and finally implement this 
change. The EU should therefore also engage with other developed countries, and the US in 
particular, as they have a role to play here, too. Furthermore, the EU’s engagement depends on 
its member states’ support and willingness to find a common approach. 
 
Thus, the EU needs to engage with third countries, and emerging powers in particular, in order to 
avoid its own marginalisation and a fragmentation of multilateral efforts which can only weaken 
the international system of global governance and the EU’s role within it. Only as equal partners 
can they render this system more effective. 
 
Engage with old and new multilateral organisations 
 
In this light, the EU also needs to think strategically about what this new engagement with third 
countries means for the multilateral system as a whole. As already mentioned above, not only have 
other countries become disillusioned with existing institutions, but they have also set about creating 
new ones. The challenge for the EU is therefore twofold: it must help alleviate this frustration with 
the established system and develop a constructive role with respect to the new organisations. 
 
While a reform of the post-war multilateral system is long overdue considering modern 
geopolitical realities, a profound reorganisation could benefit both the EU and especially emerging 
powers. In the IMF, for example, the long awaited reform brings more proportionate voting rights 
for emerging powers, and the reduced shares for EU countries could be a step towards a single 
seat for the Eurozone in the future, as only the consolidation of all member states’ voting power 
can match those of bigger economies. 
 
Nonetheless, it has to be kept in mind that the IMF represents a special case; its link to the EU’s 
strive for completion of the Economic and Monetary Union exceeds the degree of integration in 
other policy areas, and because the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly allows for the unified representation 
of euro countries in international financial institutions. 
 
The EU’s general single seat debate therefore seems pointless at times, as member states (and not 
the EU) continue to drive the multilateral agenda and most do not have an interest in giving up their 
seats. Additionally, the problem persists that not all euro member states want a single 
representation in the IMF. Still, it could serve as a model and inspire spill-over effects in the long run, 
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if EU policy develops towards further integration at the same time and EU member states eventually 
realise that they will not have enough power alone anymore to match emerging powers. 
 
At the same time, reform of the established institutions, disregarding the single seat debate, could 
render the multilateral system more effective: for example, changing the UNSC’s set-up and veto 
regime would avoid blocking important resolutions, or enhancing enforcement of binding UN 
resolutions could support their implementation. As this heightened effectiveness constitutes a 
main goal for its current multilateral agenda, the EU could become a driver of change through 
more engagement and building alliances to develop a stronger voice.  
 
That would mean consistently advocating for reform and bringing countries together to shape the 
conditions of this reform. However, that would also mean getting EU member states – first and 
foremost France and the UK, as UNSC permanent members – on board to support reform, which 
could prove even more difficult than before considering the current risk of Brexit.  
 
Furthermore, the EU – as an observer in many of these fora and being a multilateral organisation 
itself – could help to mediate between them as a third party. This kind of frontrunner position 
could also give the EU increased influence on the international stage and possibly leverage to 
introduce clauses that would allow EU membership in international organisations. The EU could 
also help involve other Western powers in this endeavour for reform, as the tendency towards 
unanimous decisions in global fora makes them responsible players as well, keeping in mind that 
it was the Congress of the US which was delaying  IMF reforms for the past years. 
 
This level of engagement is also needed regarding the new institutions that emerging powers have 
created. Instead of thinking of them as ‘parallel’ institutions, implying that they do not form part 
of the existing system of global governance and are somehow excluded, the EU needs to 
contemplate potential synergies between old and new. If the EU is to regard emerging powers as 
equal partners, it must also treat their newly set up institutions as influential interlocutors and be 
constructive about their role in global governance.  
 
As emerging powers are mainly thriving on their economic strength, the West is mainly concerned 
about the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development 
Bank, and China’s One Belt One Road initiative. Thus, the fact that several EU member states have 
already joined the AIIB shows that the EU can have a role to play in the future but also that a 
coherent EU approach to these institutions is lacking. 
 
Viewing these institutions as a challenge to the status quo and the West’s role in the world is not 
conducive to a more effective multilateralism. The EU could therefore be a frontrunner also in this 
respect and go beyond competition by reflecting on the new institutions’ complementarity with 
the established system. It has to ask what advantage the former can bring for the latter and for 
the EU itself. Only by working with these new fora, can the EU become an important player vis-à-
vis them and their members. 
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The EU’s multilateralism must be about proactive engagement 
 
In order to realise its ‘effective multilateralism’, the EU needs to be more proactive in engaging with 
third countries on a multilateral level, as well as with old and new international organisations. For 
that, the EU needs to translate this engagement into a strategy that ties in with the overall EUGS. 
 
By getting emerging powers on board as equal partners, the EU has the potential to become a 
frontrunner by providing a vision and new impetus for a reformed system of global governance 
that includes old and new institutions. In order to do so, the EU needs to develop a new way of 
thinking about its role in the world and the role of international organisations in general.  
 
In a world in which the EU is struggling to maintain its stance as a global player and the multilateral 
system risks increased fragmentation, it becomes ever more apparent that the EU is dependent 
on a cooperative relationship with emerging powers, especially if it strives for a more effective 
system. While it is certainly not the only player in this game, the EU also has an active part to play 
in the decision between blockage and progress of the international system of global governance. 
 
 
Juliane Schmidt is a Junior Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre. 
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A Multilateral Agenda for the EU: 
taking China’s Activism into Account 
 
Alice Ekman 
 
Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, China’s ambitions to reshape regional and global 
order have never been so high. Building on its newfound self-confidence in creating new 
multilateral institutions following the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) last 
year, China is likely to remain resolute in initiating and consolidating its network of new 
multilateral cooperation mechanisms of various types, formal and informal, including in Europe. 
For the EU, the challenge is first of all on its territory and immediate neighborhood, where China 
is developing sub-regional cooperation mechanisms. The challenge is also broader, as China 
currently aims to lead global governance restructuring and hopes to do so with the support of 
some EU member states. The 28-country bloc may find itself increasingly uncomfortable in this 
context of changing global governance landscape, exacerbated by an unfolding institutional 
competition between Beijing and Washington. This piece advocates the formulation of a common 
global governance vision and action plan, which would enable the EU to contribute to the on-going 
restructuring in a proactive way.  
 
Strong ambitions 
 
Currently, China’s ambitions go far beyond global economic governance. They also concern global 
environmental, cyber, security or cultural governance; and institutional creativity is now at the 
core of Xi Jinping’s ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ discourse.  
 
China is likely to create more institutions, in a diversity of fields (not only finance and economics, 
but also security) in the coming years. The White Paper on China’s military strategy published in 
May 2015 explicitly advocates ‘the establishment of a regional framework for security and 
cooperation.’3 So far, China has intended to revive and promote under its presidency a security 
architecture in Asia, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia 
(CICA), which includes more than twenty states – but neither Japan nor the US – and where it first 
unveiled its ‘Asia for Asians’ security concept (‘Asian community of common destiny’). China is also 
intending to consolidate the Xiangshan Forum, the annual Beijing-based regional security dialogue, 
seen as a potential alternative to the Shangri-La dialogue. As Beijing is well-aware of the complexity 
of setting up new international institutions, it will – in parallel – continue to create lighter, more 
flexible cooperation mechanisms (such as high-level international fora), which are interconnected 
and progressively reshaping global governance in an informal way. 
 
The diverse set of choices EU member states will have to make, in the following years, in the 
context of a China-led transformation of global governance further underlines the importance of 
providing a coordinated response vis-à-vis these developments.  
 
                                                          
3 China's Military Strategy, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, May 2015, Beijing. Part III: 
‘Strategic Guideline of Active Defence’. 
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China’s multilateral activism in the EU 
 
In the coming years, China’s global governance action will focus mainly – but not only – on its 
neighborhood (from Beijing’s perspective this means Eurasia as a whole), as the Chinese 
government considers that consolidating regional leadership is a prerequisite to the establishment 
of its global leadership.  
 
The deployment of China’s ‘great power diplomacy,’ with the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative 
at its core, is likely to have an impact on the EU, not only on the way it is connected (infrastructure 
development projects) but also on the way it is functioning (dialogues and communication channels 
with its neighbourhood). In 2012, China launched a new framework for dialogue with 16 Central and 
Eastern European countries – the so-called ‘16+1’ cooperation format – which comprises EU 
members and non-members of the EU, and involves annual meetings of heads of governments and 
is now combined with new gatherings with the same country grouping specifically on the OBOR. 
Given the experimental and flexible approach of Chinese diplomacy, China’s framework could 
potentially be applied to ‘any group of countries + 1’, and Beijing’s attempts to create similar 
frameworks in other parts of Europe (in the Mediterranean in particular) are likely to persist. Overall, 
China will likely continue to invite EU member states individually to its various initiatives, relegating 
its strategic partnership with the EU as a whole when necessary. 
 
‘One Belt One Road’: also a multilateral cooperation mechanism  
 
Global governance features as key dimension in the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy too. The OBOR 
official action plan published in March 2015 explicitly calls for the creation of a ‘balanced regional 
economic cooperation architecture’ and ‘new models of international cooperation and global 
governance.’ This global governance dimension is also becoming increasingly noticeable on the 
ground as OBOR is now presented by Chinese officials as a ‘platform’ for the gathering of senior 
domestic and international actors of various spheres (business, government administration, think 
tanks, etc.) and in various fields (construction, transport, energy, telecommunications, etc.).  
 
China will probably not institutionalize OBOR itself, as flexibility is at the core of the project, for 
both logistical and strategic reasons. But it will most likely create more ‘satellite’ institutions 
around it, such as the AIIB, as well as more ‘satellite’ informal cooperation mechanisms – such as 
high-level OBOR summits and fora – which are often combined with sub-regional fora that China 
has launched previously. In this context, the EU needs to recognise that OBOR is more than an 
infrastructure development project. It is now at the core of the new and informal institutional 
network China is currently building at the regional and global level. Even if the initiative remains 
vague in many respects, it is seen from Beijing as an opportunity to gather key regional actors and 
promote China’s key governmental concepts and priorities internationally. 
 
In this context, the EU would gain from reinforcing its own sub-regional dialogues as well as 
dialogues with Eurasian countries, while at the same time ensuring an active participation in all 
the fora and multilateral cooperation frameworks that China has launched on Europe’s territory 
and neighbourhood.  
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Diverging methodological approaches  
 
China is not the only country aiming to reshape global governance. Yet, few countries can do so 
with the same level of efficiency as China at the moment. One of the strategic objectives of the 
2003 EU Security Strategy was to build an international order based on effective multilateralism. 
Since then, China has actively pushed for the same objective in its own terms, including a 
preference for legally non-binding arrangements as well as a strong emphasis on national 
sovereignty and economic growth. China’s intensifying activism in global governance is 
accompanied by the promotion of a specific model of development, rejection of the existence of 
universal values, and – in particular in front of developing countries – explicit criticism of Western 
countries. At the moment, China clearly pushes for the restructuring of the current global order 
dominated by the ‘West.’ At the same time, China is also calling for more cooperation with the EU 
on global governance reform, hoping to gain member states’ support for its new institutional 
initiatives (as with the AIIB) while also exploiting potential divergences between the positions and 
approaches of the EU and the United States. The EU’s strategic thinking on global governance 
should take into account this alternative view on multilateralism, as well as the diverging 
methodological and ideological approaches existing between China and the EU. 
 
Attainable ambitions 
 
Chinese diplomacy can rely on a particularly large number of well-trained diplomacy professionals, 
on its extensive knowledge of existing international institutions and cooperation mechanisms, and 
on the diversity of policy-oriented analysis and recommendations on ways to reshape global 
governance. In addition, the promotion of China’s official discourse on multilateralism and global 
governance reform is supported by a specific mix of communication techniques, shaped by both a 
large propaganda apparatus copied from the Soviet Union and modernized by international PR 
firms. The influence of this well-funded communication effort and China’s overall ability to 
persuade to reshape global governance in its own terms should not be underestimated. In order 
to respond to China’s increasing activism and – political and human – capacity, the EU must first 
of all regard China as an ambitious and capable shaper of the global agenda and reformer of the 
global governance system.  
 
Building bridges among institutions through harmonization of the agendas 
 
China is building bridges between its various institutional initiatives as they emerge. For Beijing, 
the link between old and new institutions is naturally built through an alignment of the agenda 
with China’s national priority. China not only welcomes any overlap between the agendas of 
various institutions but also encourages them. In particular, since China put global infrastructure 
development at the core of economic development strategy (to tackle excess capacity, to find new 
business opportunities abroad and support the internationalization of national companies in the 
field), its diplomacy is working hard to move infrastructure development up to the top of the 
agenda of as many multilateral institutions and informal fora as possible, often in a skillful  
way. Today, infrastructure development is not only at the core of the BRICS agenda, but also of 
the G20 and all the OBOR-related summits and fora. As Beijing will host the G20 in 2016 and the 
BRICS summit in 2017, and sees the next two years a key period to lead global governance 
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restructuring, the risk of diminished diversity of the international agenda exist (constant focus on 
‘interconnectivity’, for instance).  
 
Faced with this risk, the challenge for the EU will also consist of keeping or putting back issues on 
the multilateral agenda that it considers most pressing at the moment (such as migration, 
terrorism and climate change). Not only should it do so in existing multilateral cooperation 
mechanisms, but also in the new ones through a coordinated action of its member states. In the 
AIIB – and soon perhaps also in the NDB – acceded EU member states will also need to 
demonstrate a particularly high degree of collaboration in championing their development 
standards if they intend to overcome the limited governance influence they are assigned in the 
Beijing-based bank. The ability of the Eurozone member states to form a joint constituency in the 
AIIB is a crucial first step, showing that when necessary (by virtue of their limited voting power) EU 
member states can indeed get their act together to maximize their influence. The next test case of 
EU member states’ ability to provide a unified response to a parallel multilateral structure will 
probably come in the form of the BRICS-backed New Development Bank, set to admit new 
members as of July 2017. Europeans, however, must not remain reactive against the background 
of an ongoing transformation in global governance driven by China. They, too, could create new 
multilateral structures and mechanisms (such as summits or high-level fora held annually) 
dedicated to the specific challenges they want to see addressed by the global community. These 
initiatives could notably concentrate on areas where governance is still underdeveloped such as 
space and cyber security.  
 
In brief, the EU’s stance on multilateral affairs must break with the thinking of the 20th century, 
where an accord between the United States and Europe was a sufficient building block for a global 
deal to be found. By now it is clear that China has carved out a crucial role for itself in the 
management of sub-regional, regional and global affairs, informed by its own multilateral strategy. 
Taking into account this evolution, the EU needs to clarify its own global governance vision.  
 
 
Alice Ekman is Head of China Research at the French Institute of International Relations and an 
Associate Analyst at EU Institute for Security Studies. 
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Improved Multilateral Action through the Revitalisation of EU-
Latin America Relations 
 
Joren Selleslaghs 
 
Latin America is currently not the top political concern of Europeans with the refugee crisis still 
unfolding, an increased amount of terrorist threats and a possible Brexit scenario looming this 
summer. Nor is Europe on the highest political agenda for Latin America as Brazil and Venezuela 
are going through serious political turmoil, Ecuador is recovering from a heavy earthquake and 
most Latin American diplomatic efforts are currently focused on the possible implications the US-
Cuban rapprochement may have for the rest of the region. Yet, reinvigorating relations with ‘the 
other transatlantic relationship’ is of utmost importance for the European Union (EU). In fact, there 
is more EU investment in Latin America than in Russia, India and China combined and in the coming 
years, Latin American economies are expected to grow at three times the rate of the EU.4 Latin 
America is indeed rising, even if European exporters seem to be fixated almost exclusively on 
Brazil's and Mexico's recent impressive economic growth rates.  
 
By according most of its attention to the ‘rising stars’ of the region, the EU risks neglecting its 
bilateral relations with other key Latin American countries, which may, in turn, deprive the Union 
of a crucial source of diplomatic support when manoeuvring in the multilateral arena.  Latin 
American countries’ collective objection to the EU’s quest of an upgraded status in the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2010 was revealing in this regard. This 
contribution suggests that the Union’s multilateral action should focus on upgrading its relations 
with Latin America as a whole, which could set the stage for the two continents to co-operate 
more closely in multilateral milieus.   
 
Embracing similarities  
 
The benefits of a reinvigorated EU-Latin America relationship are not limited to economics. Most 
Latin American and European countries are characterised by robust democratic systems and 
similar positions in global affairs. Europe and Latin America have been natural partners for 
centuries due to strong historical, cultural and social ties. The two regions jointly constitute over 
one-third of UN members, making a further convergence of views on important transnational 
issues of great interest if the EU wants to achieve its proclaimed aim of being a highly reliable 
regional actor for global peace and prosperity. Indeed, the EU and Latin American countries have 
tended to converge in their voting patterns at the UN on global issues such as climate change and 
the post-2015 development agenda. 
 
In an age where chaos and crisis are proliferating, the links between these two parts of the world 
offer a great potential for a closer cooperation in the multilateral arena. As an overall middle-
income region, making successful efforts to overcome entrenched conflicts, and advancing  
  
                                                          
4 The Guardian, EU and Latin-America: strategic partnership, 25 December 2012.  
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towards democracy and socio-economic development, the countries of the Americas represent 
key partners of strategic choice for the EU. Yet today, most EU efforts are directed to only few 
Latin American countries, notably Brazil and Mexico, both being also strategic partners of the EU.5 
As some of the other Latin American nations have become significant contributors to a global rules-
based order (think of Chile’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations), it is highly 
recommended that the EU further invests in its relations with Latin America as a whole, thus also 
boosting its impact on the global policy agenda. 
 
Responding to a new geopolitical narrative  
 
Importantly, Latin America is increasingly characterised by a new geopolitical narrative 
attributable to two reasons. First, China is becoming an influential investor and economic player 
in Latin America. Second, as a result of the recent United States-Cuba rapprochement, the US’s 
role in the region is seen in a new light.6 Although the EU is currently the Latin American countries’ 
main foreign investor and second trading partner, this is likely to change in the medium-term. 
Having already signed free trade agreements with Chile and Costa Rica, China has continued to 
gain ground in the region, most notably by becoming Brazil’s largest export market and primary 
foreign investor.  
 
The EU has no less of a stake in the future (geo)political architecture of the region either. By 
providing assistance to tackle transnational and drugs-related organised crime and supporting 
legal arbitration and peace diplomacy in border and territorial waters disputes in the region, the 
28-country bloc could help render the 21st century a peaceful and progressive era. In addition, the 
EU would benefit from garnering further Latin American contributions to solving global challenges 
with a particular emphasis on climate change, terrorism, resource scarcity and food security.  In 
what follows, I propose four concrete areas of shared aspirations and mutual opportunities which 
can bring EU-Latin American relations to the next level.  
 
1. A shared Community of Development 
 
First and foremost, in order to build a more effective relationship with the region, the EU should 
render its present approach to Latin America more reflective of a (shared) vision of becoming a 
community of development instead of a community for development. As such, the EU should look 
at Latin America not as a region to ‘help’ and to which ‘technical assistance’ and ‘development aid’ 
should be directed, but as an equal partner in development, using a mix of low and high politics.  
A good example of this shift in mind-set is the recent initiative related to the ‘Digital Single Market’ 
in which a shared EU-Latin America ICT gateway is developed.7  
 
  
                                                          
5 M. García, The European Union and Latin America: Transformative power Europe versus the realities of economic 
interests’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 28.4, 2015, pp. 621-640. 
6 For details, see Friends of Europe, EU-Latin America Relations, charting a course for the future, 2015, p. 44. 
7 European Commission, Building digital bridges: Transatlantic cooperation in ICT, Speech by Vice-President Ansip, in charge of 
the Digital Single Market, Brookings Institute, Washington, 2015, p. 2. 
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Such a relationship is not a one-way street, from the EU to Latin America. In fact, Europe needs 
new markets, and Latin America needs European-style small and medium-sized enterprises to 
grow. Latin America needs Germany's famed dual vocational training system in order to make the 
region self-reliant and ready to face new global (economic) challenges and Europe needs Latin 
America’s highly innovative eco-technology to find sustainable solutions to combat climate 
change. In addition, Europe’s model for student exchange can potentially serve as a model for 
economic/societal growth through enhanced regional integration and exchange of young people 
across the Latin American continent as it ‘increases the quality of the learning and teaching 
experience of both students and academics.’8  
 
2. Enhanced cooperation in research and development  
 
Most Latin American exports to the EU are still primary products such as soya beans, oil, minerals 
and coffee. In order to sustain their widening middle class, Latin American countries need to find 
ways of increasing the share of products with higher added value in their export.9 One hindering 
factor, however, is these countries’ historical low spending on research, development and 
technology innovation, which only amounts to around half percent of the continent’s gross 
domestic product. In contrast, the EU has been investing considerably in research, development 
and technology innovation over the last years through programmes such as the Horizon 2020, 
Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KIC’s) and European Fund for Strategic Investments 
(Juncker Plan). In order to support Latin America in investing more in this area, the EU should 
provide its partner with further access and ways of collaboration in these initiatives and 
programmes. As the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) former Managing Director for the 
Americas, Christian Leffler, recently stated, this area is ‘extremely promising for taking the 
relationship further.’10 
 
3. Intensified partnership in crisis management 
 
Another area of particular interest for reinvigorating the EU-Latin America relationship concerns 
the area of crisis management. With UN peacekeeping operations currently overstretched, 
Washington’s increasing proclivity to ‘lead from behind’ and the growing need to address 
transnational security threats multilaterally, there is a rising demand for regional actors to act in 
concert. Since the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2003, the EU has 
increasingly built a reputation of a regional actor willing to take a leading role in the strengthening 
of international security. Yet, its resources and capabilities are limited and it increasingly seeks 
partners with which to collaborate in order to ensure rapid and effective action. Some of those 
reliable partners have tended to come from Latin America: countries like Argentina, Brazil and the 
Dominican Republic have participated in EU crisis management operations (in Haiti, Bosnia 
Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), while Chile and Colombia have formalised 
their contributions to CSDP missions and operations by signing Framework Participation 
Agreements (FPA). 
 
                                                          
8 Speech of Teresa Jiménez Becerril-Barrio at the European Policy Summit, Brussels, 4th of June 2015.  
9 Friends of Europe, ibid., pp. 17-18.   
10 Friends of Europe, ibid., p. 13.   
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Yet, an encompassing institutionalised framework is still missing. As a result, and even if 
cooperation on today’s security issues such as maritime security, arms trafficking and drug-related 
crime has a considerable track record at a regional level, crisis management cooperation continues 
to follow a bilateral logic, arguably conditioned by the absence of a Latin American regional 
equivalent of the EU’s CSDP. Therefore, if the EU intends to strengthen further its legitimacy as a 
security provider in the eyes of Latin American leaders and reach out for further cooperation in 
this highly promising area, it should promote a possible shared EU-Latin-American regional 
strategy or programme in the area of security and defence policy. 
 
4. Revitalised inter-regional dimension  
 
In order to be more effective, the EU should also bring (new) life into the inter-regional dimension 
of its partnership with Latin America instead of acting bilaterally. A clear example hereof is 
cooperation in the area of combating organised crime which, due to the nature of the problem, 
could be treated more effectively at the inter-regional level by building new forms of cooperation 
between Europol and its relevant Latin American sister-organisations (such as Ameripol).  
 
A significant first step would be to follow up on the EEAS proposal to hold regular bi-regional 
meetings with all foreign ministries of EU and Latin American countries in between two EU-CELAC 
summits.11 In addition, the EU should also enlarge its interaction with the various Latin American 
(sub-)regions and respective organisations such as SICA (Central America), CAN (Andean 
Community) and MERCOSUR/UNASUR (South America).12 Central in the relationship with these 
sub-regions are the possible signing of association – or far-reaching trade – agreements. As such, 
the EU has been negotiating a possible free trade agreement with MERCOSUR since 2010 whose 
prompt finalisation would benefit both sides. In addition, the EU member states would also be well 
advised to follow through with the ratification of the EU-Central America Association Agreement 
signed in 2012. 
 
Joint strategy for EU-Latin America relations 
 
None of the above goals will be reached, however, if Europeans fail to pool the means and tools 
of diplomacy and foreign policy towards Latin America. A truly comprehensive diplomacy involves 
linking foreign, trade, aid, and security policies which is more difficult to achieve in certain Latin 
American countries than in others.13 Arguably, political regimes that are externally assertive or 
reactively defensive, such as that of Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela, pose a particular challenge 
to an enhanced EU-Latin America relationship.  
 
Nonetheless, with the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Federica Mogherini 
preparing a ‘Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union’, the time is 
right to seriously re-invigorate the relationship with the EU’s other transatlantic partners and 
define a well-articulated action plan. Rebuilding EU-Latin America relations on the four pillars set 
                                                          
11 CELAC is the Spanish acronym for Community of Latin American Countries. 
12 SICA is the Spanish acronym for the Central American Regional Integration System, CAN is the Spanish acronym for the 
Andean Community Regional Integration System, UNASUR is the Spanish acronym for the Union of South American Nations 
and MERCOSUR is the Spanish acronym for the Southern Common Market. 
13 S. Gratius, Susanne, ‘Europe and Latin America: in need of a new paradigm,’ FRIDE Working Paper, 116, 2013, p. 18. 
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forth above may translate into a significantly improved relationship between the two and will also 
provide the Union with reliable partners when acting multilaterally.   
 
 
Joren Selleslaghs is a Lecturer and Researcher at Leiden University. He is also an Individual Expert 
for the European Commission and a Member of the Board of Directors of the Europe-Central 
America Chamber of Commerce.  
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Multilateral EU Action through Science Diplomacy
14
 
 
Luk Van Langenhove 
 
For decades now, the EU has been trying to build up its own capacity to act as a global and regional 
power. This has proved to be a difficult endeavour as the hard power of the Union remains limited, 
in terms of both the military capacity of its member states and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) hardware. Consequently, it has been repeatedly argued that the EU should shift the 
emphasis to its soft power. But the embrace of such a soft power approach has not yet resulted in 
a clear and comprehensive soft power strategy.  
 
This contribution asserts that by investing in its science diplomacy, the EU could significantly 
increase its soft power and its effectiveness when acting in multilateral contexts. More specifically, 
I argue that there are three main areas where the EU’s multilateral action could be significantly 
strengthened by its science diplomacy: (i) Regional security (ii) Trade and (iii) Global issues. 
 
If not hard, then at least soft power? 
 
Soft power mostly takes the form of a narrative that refers to democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality of human rights and the like. Reliance on norms and values and the power of example 
became a major distinctive trademark of the EU. But for many observers outside Europe this was 
seen as a self-promotion and a desire to export its model.15  
 
In recent years, science and technology have become increasingly perceived as potential 
instruments for soft power policies. Advocates of science diplomacy argue that science can achieve 
goals that are in line with national interests. First, it is often said that the ‘invisible colleges’ of 
scientists across state-borders can contribute to building trust between nations or cultures. 
Secondly, it is also argued that the language of science can contribute to pointing to technical 
solutions for political problems. One can thus distinguish between science and technology 
relations that occur without government intervention and science diplomacy when governmental 
officials try to shape and stimulate relations to advance national interests.16  
 
Three varieties of science diplomacy can be distinguished:17 diplomacy for science, science in 
diplomacy and science for diplomacy. First, diplomacy for science is mainly about the facilitation 
of international scientific collaboration. Here, classical tools of diplomacy are put to use to support 
the scientific and technological community. It is about using diplomacy in order to establish 
cooperation agreements at government or institutional level. The goal of diplomacy for science 
actions is to benefit from foreign science and technology capacity in order to improve the national 
capacity. Second, with science in diplomacy, the roles are reversed: here, the scientists are 
                                                          
14 This contribution is written in the context of the EL-CSID project (see www.el-csid.eu) that receives funding from the 
Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme under Grant agreement No. 693799. 
15 See for instance Télo and Ponjaert (2013) for a critical review of the EU’s foreign Policy 
16 See Arndt (2006) for introducing this distinction when discussing cultural diplomacy. 
17 This distinction was first used in the 2010 landmark report published by the U.K. Royal Society and the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science. 
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prompted towards supporting foreign policy. This has resulted in mobilising national scientific and 
technological resources for the development of arms as well as in using scientific knowledge in 
foreign policy decisions. Third, science for diplomacy goes one step further: here, science is used 
as a tool to build and improve relations between states. This can be done when there are tensions 
in relations between certain states or when states are faced with common problems that they 
cannot solve on their own. Scientific collaboration is used here to provide collaborative 
relationships that are based upon a so-called non-ideological basis. 
  
Building upon European strengths: bring in the scientists! 
 
The geopolitical situation of Europe is under scrutiny. After centuries of playing a major role in the 
world, Europe is facing today a number of challenges. First, the economic gravity is shifting from 
the Transatlantic to the Asia-Pacific. Secondly, it is faced with a demographic decline. Thirdly, some 
of its values are increasingly called into question. Within this context, it is important to realise what 
its strengths are and how these strengths can be used for playing a global or regional role in today’s 
increasingly multipolar world. This is where science and technology come in. 
 
The EU is a world leader in research and innovations. With only 500 million people or 7% of the 
world’s population, it accounts for 24% of world expenditure on research and 32% of high-impact 
publications and 32% of patent applications. To be sure, emerging countries are strengthening 
their research and innovation systems, but the EU seems to be able to maintain its proportional 
share in the number of publications. In debates on the EU’s capacities as a global and regional 
player, research and technology should therefore be taken into account. The scientific potential of 
the EU should be considered as a strength that can be mobilised as a soft power tool. But this 
needs a vision on what to achieve as well as an organisational structure that clearly links the EU 
external action to Research and Technical Development (RTD) policy. 
 
Science and technology is a policy domain that is shared by the EU member states and the EU. 
Today, through its so-called Horizon 2020 programme, the EU is investing about €80 billion 
between 2014 and 2020. Part of this endeavour is directed towards the external dimension. Since 
2012, a strategic approach has been adopted to enhance and focus the Union’s international 
cooperation activities in science and innovation. In the document COM (2012) 497, it is clearly 
stated that such international cooperation should support the EU’s external polices by 
coordinating closely with enlargement, neighbourhood, trade and its CFSP. The same document 
also states that ‘Science Diplomacy’ has to be used as an instrument of soft power and as a 
mechanism for improving relations with key countries and regions.18 A similar point of view is 
expressed in COM(2014)339Final, where it is stressed that further efforts need to be made in 
addressing the external dimension of research and innovation policy.19 In a speech delivered at 
the European Institute in Washington on 1 June 2015, the EU Commissioner for Research, Science 
and Innovation boldly stated that he wants ‘science diplomacy to play a leading role in our global 
outreach for its uniting power.’20 In that same speech, he compared science diplomacy to a torch 
that can ‘light the way, where other kinds of politics and diplomacy have failed.’ As an example he 
                                                          
18 European Commission, Enhancing and focusing EU international cooperation in research and innovation: A strategic 
approach, Brussels, 14 April 2012. 
19 European Commission, Research and innovation as sources of renewed growth, Brussels, 10 June 2014. 
20 C. Moedas, The EU approach to science diplomacy, European Institute, Washington, 1 June 2015.  
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referred to relations between the EU and Russia, where notwithstanding the current sanctions, 
Russian scientists are still a welcome partner to the Horizon2020 programme. 
 
Towards a comprehensive EU science diplomacy strategy? 
 
If the EU wants to continue with its ambition to be a global actor and fully use its ‘soft power’, it is 
time to put more meat to the bones of that concept. Indeed, the European culture and science are 
valuable instruments for the deployment of soft power, but in order to ensure that these 
instruments are effective, a clear EU strategy is needed. As a first step, the EU should start with 
answering the question what interests it wants to serve. My proposal would be to focus upon three 
areas that are a mix of self-interests and aspirations to have a positive impact on the world. These 
areas are: (i) Science and technology contributions towards enhancing regional security in its 
neighbourhood, (ii) Science and technology contributions towards improving European trade in 
the world and (iii) Science and technology contributions towards tackling global problems. 
 
A first avenue for streamlining the EU’s science diplomacy activities could thus be a focus on the 
European eastern and southern surrounding regions that contain many conflict areas and even 
weak and failed states that pose serious security threats to the EU. Here, science diplomacy could 
serve as a means to build and strengthen relations and trust between the EU and those regions by 
connecting their scientific communities better to the EU’s own scientific world. But obviously, 
scientific cooperation alone cannot be a panacea for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Science diplomacy in this context needs to be part of an integrated approach to peace and security, 
hence the need for a coordinated approach between DG Research & Innovation (DG RTD) and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). 
 
The EU is the largest economy in the world and the largest trading bloc. This is reflected in the fact 
that the EU is the top trading partner for eighty countries while the US, for instance, is the prime 
trading partner for only some twenty countries.21 The EU negotiates many different trade-related 
agreements with countries and regions all over the world with the aim of removing barriers to trade. 
This opens a second avenue for an EU science diplomacy focus as part of these barriers relate to 
technical standards and norms. There is a clear link between such barriers and scientific knowledge 
and technological developments, so research cooperation between trade partners can pave the way 
for future regulations. Here, coordination between DG TRADE and DG RTD is essential. 
 
It is clear that neither trade and economics, nor regional security, however important they are for 
Europe, can be the only concern in the EU’s relationships with third countries. There is today a 
world-wide consensus that the world is faced with a number of global problems that cannot be 
tackled at the level of individual states. And those global problems are of such a nature that they 
involve scientific knowledge in order to describe them. In other words, science can play a role in 
dealing with global issues and thus be used for the benefit of the world community. This opens a 
third avenue for an EU science diplomacy which is already reflected in the current Horizon 2020 
programme that focuses on a number of societal challenges such as health, demographic change 
and wellbeing; food security; energy; climate action and secure societies. These challenges are not 
only scientific challenges, but also policy challenges. On 25 September 2015, countries assembled 
                                                          
21 DG Trade, EU position in world trade, European Commission, Brussels, 2013.  
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at the United Nations (UN) adopted a set of ambitious Sustainable Development Goals to end 
poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all as part of a new sustainable 
development agenda. Each goal has specific targets to be achieved over the next fifteen years. For 
these goals to be reached, different actors need to do their part: governments, the private sector, 
civil society and also the scientific communities. Aligning the EU’s Horizon 2020 programme with 
the UN’s sustainable development agenda might be a third avenue for further developing an EU 
science diplomacy strategy.  
 
Finally, it should be clear that whatever the strategic choices made for a future EU science 
diplomacy policy, there is also a need to ensure that it becomes a fully-fledged part of the wider 
EU foreign policy thinking – a great occasion for doing so is presented by the ongoing EUGS 
reflection process. Today, science diplomacy is already mentioned as one of the policy domains of 
the EEAS, but it is not yet central to its strategy. There remains therefore much room for 
improvement in integrating the efforts of DG RTD in science diplomacy within the EEAS and 
Member States’ diplomatic activities. More coordination between DG RTD, DG TRADE and the 
EEAS, as well as more internal coordination within the EEAS would serve to ensure that the EU’s 
science and cultural diplomacy actions are fully contributing as soft power tools to the EU’s foreign 
policy. The above mentioned prioritization on supporting free trade arrangements, ensuring 
regional security in its neighbourhood and contributing to the UN’s sustainable development 
agenda, could be a first step towards realising the EU’s ambition of being a more effective 
multilateral actor. 
 
 
Luk Van Langenhove is a Research Professor at the Institute of European Studies at the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel, and director of the United Nations University Institute for Comparative 
Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS). 
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The EU on the Multilateral Stage: 
building a Global Energy and Climate Community 
 
Gerald Stang 
 
Despite the pessimistic malaise that hangs over so much foreign policy discussion in the EU today, 
the Union remains an essential actor on the world stage, continuing to define the future of our 
planet more than any other power, save perhaps the United States. Contrary to the wishful 
declarations of foreign autocrats and the woeful lamentations of many political commentators, 
this power is more than a waning remnant of past dominance or an anachronistic product of power 
imbalances within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). It is a function of the EU's accumulated wealth, its functioning markets, its educated and 
resilient citizens, and the relative effectiveness of its democratic governance system to act in their 
interest. Power is a relative concept; everything need not be going swimmingly in the 28-country 
bloc for it to be able to project itself successfully on the international stage. All of EU's international 
partners and competitors have their own challenges at home, and often lack the strengths that 
the EU and its member states possess.  
 
This contribution argues that the EU should focus part of its multilateral agenda on the creation of 
a ‘Global Energy and Climate Community’ that unites the climate and energy goals of the largest 
number of countries possible, building on the example of the Energy Union in Europe. 
 
Scale up the ambition 
 
The above estimation of the EU's international influence may seem out of place these days, with 
the member states continuing their slow recovery from the financial crisis and the relationship 
between Brussels and national capitals being openly questioned in some quarters. But it is an error 
to suggest that the EU should overcompensate for previous unrealistic expectations about shaping 
the post-Cold War order by limiting its goals to retrenchment, minimalism, stabilisation and 
survival. The EU institutions and the member states continue to shape international discourse and 
define the paths of future progress on trade, economic development (sustainable and market-
based), the relationship between governments and their citizens, and most especially at the nexus 
of climate and energy – where aggressively competitive energy geopolitics tangle with the 
gargantuan challenge of minimising and managing climactic disruption to life on earth. 
 
For as long as the oil age has lasted, there has been wealth and power tied up with the control of 
petroleum resources. But as the world is forced to pursue decarbonisation more aggressively, the 
future of our energy systems is becoming increasingly linked to the future of the planet's climate. 
Those that are able to best understand this link, finding new and effective ways to decouple 
economic growth from carbon use, will be the ones shaping the future of energy use on earth. And 
the EU is in the lead on these issues.22 
                                                          
22 In the area of energy and environmental policy, the relations between the EU and its member states are guided by shared 
competences. In practice, this means that the EU has the competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy, 
but the member states can also exercise competence. 
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Global energy & climate community  
 
The EU’s leadership begins with its domestic efforts to create an internal energy market while 
pursuing continental decarbonisation. Pessimists may point to how slow and intermittent these 
processes have been and how far we still have to go to create green, liquid, well-functioning gas 
and electricity markets across the continent. But despite continued obstacles in finding 
convergence among member state energy plans and developing common programs such as the 
emissions carbon trading system (ETS),23 the last two decades have seen remarkable convergence 
of thinking across Europe for how energy markets should work and what our long term energy 
goals are for energy security, sustainability and competitiveness. In 2015, these efforts were given 
new impetus within the ‘Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking 
Climate Change Policy.’ 
 
The Energy Union highlights how closely interrelated are climate and energy goals, and how much 
domestic action toward these goals is dependent on successful international action. Improving 
energy security, for example, is helped by the development of interconnections among member 
states and increasing the diversity of suppliers and routes to the EU, but also by assisting 
neighbours and transit states to improve their own energy security. The EU has made progress on 
this front in Eastern Europe through its support for the Energy Community, which is helping states 
from Ukraine to the Balkans to address their energy security concerns and to move toward EU-
level thinking for managing energy markets. While not a member of the EU, Ukraine's slow 
improvements in market transparency, energy efficiency, and energy security have direct 
implications for its neighbours both to its east and to its west. Just as both climate goals and energy 
security are improved by reductions in energy demand at home, helping partner countries reduce 
their energy demand helps push down the global demand curve, improving the leverage of energy 
importers and disincentivizing the expansion of fossil fuel industries. 
 
However, while the Energy Union is lauded for the vision that it lays out, winning support from 
across the continent and translating that vision into concrete actions remain a work in progress. 
Forging agreement on specific actions on the climate-energy nexus requires extensive and iterative 
work to address the connections with the broader goals of economic, social and foreign policy for 
each of the governments involved. Even in the 28-country bloc, each government has different 
priorities and risks – risks of gas cut-off from Russia, for example, or of economic stagnation, or of 
being significantly affected by climate impacts if those are not distributed or experienced evenly. 
And beyond the EU, while most countries subscribe to the development of secure, sustainable, 
liquid and apolitical energy markets, not all do. And among those that do support such a view, 
each has their own unique energy challenges, seeking to move forward at their own pace and on 
their own path. The United States, for example, is an essential partner for the EU on many issues, 
including climate action, but has unique domestic challenges for signing and applying international 
                                                          
23 The ETS is a key pillar of EU efforts to mitigate climate change and its foremost tool for limiting industrial greenhouse gas 
emissions cost-effectively. The EU ETS remains the globe’s first and largest international system for trading greenhouse gas 
emission allowances, covering more than 10.000 power stations and industrial plants in 31 countries, as well as airlines. 
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agreements, as seen with its reluctance to join the Energy Charter Treaty24 or ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol.25  
 
This is why an EU multilateral agenda on energy and climate should involve a confident long term 
vision for energy and climate change, both in Europe and at the global level: a ‘Global Energy and 
Climate Community’ that unites climate and energy goals for communities at the international 
level, just as they are beginning to unite at the European level via the Energy Union. The broad 
areas of action for the Energy Union can serve as a template: energy security, integrated markets, 
energy efficiency, climate action, and innovation.26 Promoting such a vision globally can be a 
diplomatically challenging prospect, with so much of the world sharing the same interests as 
Europe, but uninterested in seeing them defined by the EU or as European. As was shown with the 
success of the recent agreement at the Paris Climate Change Conference (COP21),27 it is possible 
to build wide international support for a global vision, provided that it allows national self-
determination in finding the best paths to apply that vision. So a global energy and climate 
community could be driven by the EU, but not defined by the EU, and would need to be a wide 
multilateral project from the start. 
 
Creating such a community need not involve the creation of a new body or a rule set to manage 
it; it can involve the harnessing of power of existing initiatives in pursuit of a common vision that 
breaks down silos between energy and climate communities. Organisations as diverse as the 
G20,28 the International Energy Agency, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Energy Charter Treaty already 
work on both climate and energy issues, and can serve as potential landing points for work on a 
global community, so long as they are supportive of a common central vision. But as any 
international organisation is created to serve the interests of member states, it will be essential to 
build partnerships and coalitions that can be used to shape wider multilateral processes and shape 
the work of international organisations. 
 
Don’t go it alone 
 
For the EU to win support for its global vision, it will need to become a better partner on energy and 
climate issues. The Union leads best by setting a positive, but humble, example in its pursuit of the 
climate and energy goals that it has laid out for itself, and by bringing the most relevant aspects of 
this example to share with its international partners. So for the energy importers in its 
neighbourhood, they can be incentivized to move closer into line with the EU's own climate and 
energy project, as has been done with the states of the Energy Community in Eastern Europe. For 
                                                          
24 The Energy Charter Treaty is a multilateral framework for energy cooperation. It  is principal is to enhance energy security 
through the promotion of more open and competitive energy markets, while also strictly  observing the principles of sustainable 
development and sovereignty in the field of energy policy. In force since April 1998, the Energy Charter Treaty has fifty-four 
signatories, including the EU and Euratom.  
25 Although the US signed the document on 12 November 1998, the Clinton Presidency never submitted it to the Senate for 
ratification. 
26 European Commission, A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, 
25 February 2015. 
27 The 195 signatory countries agreed on a series of measures, including the goal of limiting the increase in global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. 
28  See for example the Presidency Statement on Climate Change at the G20 Sherpa Meeting on 8 April 2016. 
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energy importers further afield, especially trend-setting regional powers such as China and India, the 
connections between energy security and energy efficiency can be emphasized, showing how 
pursuit of climate goals can pay energy dividends. For energy exporters, from Algeria to Russia and 
Azerbaijan, the message can be more focused on the predictability and demand security benefits 
that flow from the application of transparency and the rule of law in international energy trade. For 
all of these countries, the impact of climate and energy visions (and decisions) on jobs and economic 
competitiveness must be addressed directly and confidently, allowing the EU and its partners to 
shape together a greener, less energy-intensive future that can leave all of us better off. 
 
The EU remains an essential global leader. It can play an important role in defining our common 
energy future if it acts courageously, but humbly, with confidence in the principles that already 
guide its work today in the energy and climate field.  
 
 
Gerald Stang is a Senior Associate Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies.  
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Countering Terrorism through Proactive Multilateral EU Action 
 
Beatrice Berton 
 
In the aftermath of yet another terrorist attack at the heart of Europe, world leaders are calling for 
unity to address a threat which is increasing in intensity and spreading globally. Terrorist activity is 
currently at its highest recorded level and more countries than ever before are experiencing high 
levels of terrorism.29 The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) alone is estimated to be 
present in at least nineteen countries.30 Shifting alliances and increased competition between 
Jihadist groups (especially ISIL and Al-Qaeda) have widened the geographical scope of the threat, as 
they strive to attract more recruits, gain access to resources and enhance their relevance in the 
global arena. Inflated flows of foreign fighters and widespread radicalisation happening online and 
offline, within the EU and outside its borders, have prompted calls for a more coordinated 
international response. This chapter contends that the EU’s multilateral agenda must concentrate 
on strengthening international co-operation on counter-terrorism activities, starting with a better 
organisation of the internal and external aspects of its own counter-terrorism activities. 
 
Looking two ways 
 
The EU is asserting itself as one of the leading global players in the fight against terrorism – a key 
threat identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003. If the global challenges addressed 
in the ESS are still relevant today, many argue that the strategy fails to mirror the current 
geopolitical balance and is in dire need of an overhaul. EU counter-terrorism action encompasses 
both the domains of internal and external security, spanning across the European Commission, 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies such as Europol and Eurojust, the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) and the Council Working Party on Terrorism (COTER). A revamped strategic 
approach would have to effectively mainstream counter-terrorism in the EU’s multilateral agenda, 
whilst bridging the gaps between the internal and external dimensions of the EU institutional 
counter-terrorism architecture. A comprehensive EU approach to counter-terrorism should be 
looking outward – promoting the EU’s persona in multilateral organisations and regional fora, 
while also deepening the EU’s engagement with key partners (notably Turkey); and inward – 
ensuring better integration and more flexibility to all EU actors with counter-terrorism capabilities, 
with a greater focus on the internal/external security nexus.  
 
Looking outward: multilateral, regional and bilateral cooperation 
 
The international community has at its disposal a wide range of instruments in the fight against 
terrorism, stemming from inter-governmental cooperation – global, regional or sub-regional 
bodies – to trans-governmental networks of experts and practitioners.31 With objectives ranging 
from generating political will to the setting of international standards and capacity-building 
                                                          
29 Global Terrorism Index, START, 2015. 
30 L. Curtis et al., Combating the ISIS Foreign Fighter Pipeline: A Global Approach,’ Special Report #180 on Terrorism, The 
Heritage Foundation, 2016. 
31 A. Millair, Multilateral Counterterrorism: Harmonizing Political Direction and Technical Expertise, Policy Analysis Brief, The 
Stanley Foundation, 2010.  
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projects, the most relevant fora the EU cooperates with are the United Nations (UN), the Global 
Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). As well as promoting 
UN counter-terrorism resolutions in third countries through the work of COTER,32 the EU has also 
responded well to the impetus from multilateral bodies with regard to the threat of foreign 
fighters. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 2178, calling upon states to 
criminalise travelling abroad for terrorism, will be transposed into EU law with the proposed 
directive on combating terrorism, currently under review by the European Parliament. In line with 
UN resolutions, the EU has also placed sanctions on individuals associated with ISIL, the Al-Qaeda 
network and the Taliban. Notwithstanding the strong international legal framework and the 
multiplicity of instruments, multilateral counter-terrorism is failing to gain traction due to uneven 
motivation, different threat perceptions and lack of political will among UN members.33  
 
Regional and sub-regional organisations are perhaps better placed to lead tailored initiatives at the 
local community level and rely on civil society organisations (CSOs) for their implementation: the 
Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
the EU and representatives from CSOs worked together on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 
initiatives in the Western Balkans. Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on counter-terrorism 
cooperation have been signed between the EU and OIC, as well as with the League of Arab States 
(LAS), amidst the European Parliament’s concerns on the absence of human rights safeguards. 
 
The EU’s proactive stance in multilateral and regional counter-terrorism efforts, in addition to 
benefitting the development of its own institutional counter-terrorism architecture, has furthered 
the legitimacy of the EU as a trusted partner in bilateral cooperation with third countries. EU 
bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation with third states usually entails political dialogues, 
bilateral agreements and technical aid.34 €142 million has been earmarked by the EU in the past 
year to fund projects in several countries,35 ranging from the provision of training to law 
enforcement and criminal justice personnel to social initiatives to tackle radicalisation. Counter-
terrorism packages have been offered to a number of countries, the most recent being Tunisia and 
Jordan, and counter-terrorism dialogues have been conducted with Pakistan and Turkey.36 A 
project on enhancing EU-Turkey cooperation vis-à-vis foreign fighters has been budgeted from the 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and new counter-terrorism initiatives will be 
mainstreamed in activities with Libya. Even if these initiatives are sometimes regarded as 
delivering assistance and support, it should be noted that the benefit is mutual, as the EU can learn 
extensively from MENA countries and their experience in counter-radicalisation, which is a practice 
still at its infancy in EU countries.  
 
The most fruitful counter-terrorism partnership the EU has is no doubt the one with its 
transatlantic ally, the United States. The EU and the US’s long history of cooperation in counter-
terrorism has not always been a smooth ride. Different approaches towards data protection have 
                                                          
32 P. Wennerholm, E. Brattberg and M. Rhinard, The EU as a counter-terrorism actor abroad: finding opportunities, 
overcoming constraints, EPC Issue Paper No.60, 2010. 
33 The Global Regime for Terrorism, Issue Brief, Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. 
34 E. Brattberg and M. Rhinard, ‘The EU as a global counter-terrorism actor in the making,’ Swedish Institute of International 
Affairs, European Security, 21:4, 2012, pp. 557-577. 
35 Letter from HR/VP to EU Ministers for Foreign Affairs, 04 December 2015 
36 Council of the European Union, Report of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Brussels, 4 March 2016.  
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jammed negotiations over the exchange of information on flight passengers and money transfers 
(Passenger Name Record and SWIFT arrangements), with an understanding being reached upon 
the inclusion of additional safeguards for data protection.  
 
In the realm of law enforcement, Europol and the US signed a cooperation agreement in 2001. This 
was the start of a mutually beneficial joint venture, which is being bolstered by Europol’s expanded 
counter-terrorism capabilities. Last year, the European Counter-Terrorism Centre was launched, 
comprising the EU Internet Referral Unit, tasked to identify online terrorist propaganda and refer it 
to the relevant companies providing online services for takedown. Cooperation on foreign fighters 
has been enhanced by the Focal Point Travellers agreement, which focuses on identifying returnees 
to the EU and the US, as well as facilitators of travelling and recruitment. Europol and the FBI recently 
signed a new agreement facilitating the exchange of information on foreign fighters between the 
two agencies. Information sharing of financial nature had already been corroborated in the EU-US 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) framework since 2010.  
 
Looking inward: the internal/external security nexus 
 
Strictly national approaches to counter-terrorism began to loosen up after 9/11, and substantial 
progress was made after the bombings in London and Madrid. The EU’s commitment to ‘combat 
terrorism globally’ expressed in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and bolstered by the 
appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC), has prepared the ground for an array of 
policies and instruments that, being mostly incident driven37, have fallen short of conveying a truly 
coordinated approach to counter-terrorism. The division of the EU’s external and internal security 
and all the corresponding instruments does not balance the intertwined nature of external and 
internal threats.38 A lack of cross-institutional flexibility, legal and political constraints both at the 
EU and national level continue to hinder effective cooperation.  
 
Recently, the EU has announced its intention of stepping up the use of JHA tools within its counter-
terrorism cooperation activities – with a special focus on MENA countries – and to lay the ground 
for EU agencies (mainly Europol and Frontex) to develop frameworks for cooperation on 
information exchange, law enforcement and judicial matters.39 Calls ‘to further reinforce links 
between Justice and Home Affairs and the Common Security and Defence Policy’ were also 
included in the European Security Agenda of April 2015. The document underlines the importance 
of foreign policy relations on two interlinked priorities, the response to violent extremism and the 
issue of foreign fighters. There are also plans to extend the reach of the Radicalisation Awareness 
Network to act on priority countries such as Turkey as well as other partners in the MENA region 
and in the Western Balkans.  At the crux of dealing with the issue of foreign fighters is information 
exchange: JHA agencies are well placed to develop secure channels for sharing relevant 
information on foreign fighters, also with third countries. The interconnected issue of border 
control has prompted Frontex’s upgrade, allowing for an enhanced role of Frontex officials taking 
part in joint operations on the territory of third countries based on working arrangements. 
However, these types of ‘technical relationships’ have suffered criticism for not being accountable 
                                                          
37 J. Argomaniz, O. Bures and C. Kaunert, A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment, 
Intelligence and National Security, 30:2-3, 2015, pp. 191-206. 
38 M. Drent, L. Landman and D. Zandee, The EU as a Security Provider, Clingendael Report, 2014.  
39 Foreign Affairs Council, Outcome of the Council Meeting of 9 February 2015, Brussels. 
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nor open to judicial review,40 raising fundamental rights concerns. Similarly, while Europol has 
already established successful operational partnerships with a number of third countries, 
operational cooperation with Turkey and other MENA countries seems to be deadlocked due to 
their legislation’s falling short of  EU data protection standards.41 
 
Inter-institutional cooperation, especially within the CSDP missions, remains a fledgling and 
underused practice. Since August 2015, counter-terrorism/security attachés have been deployed 
to EU Delegations in Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Algeria. 
Their expertise on the field could be translated into valuable information for both Europol and the 
EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (IntCen), provided the establishment of appropriate channels.   
 
A comprehensive counter-terrorism approach in the EU Global Strategy  
 
The EU has come a long way in facing the threat of terrorism. EU member states, which historically 
have shown a preference for bilateral arrangements or informal networks in counter-terrorism 
cooperation, are starting to recognise the added value of a multilateral and multidimensional 
approach that only the EU can provide. The active involvement in multilateral fora such as the UN, 
the GCTF and the FATF has been a driver for the EU to align itself with international standards, 
thus contributing to the build-up of a robust legal framework. The development of a common 
lexicon lies at the core of a mutual understanding and is essential to an efficient multilateral 
cooperation. To this end, the EU should take a proactive stance in working – within the UN 
framework – towards a universally accepted definition of terrorism, based on its own experience 
in advancing a common EU definition. Moreover, by capitalising on its bilateral agreements, the 
EU could push for wider implementation of UN resolutions in partner countries. The EU should 
also invest in new counter-terrorism oriented partnerships with regional and sub-regional actors, 
with a special focus on CSOs involvement.  
 
Aligning member states’ counter-terrorism goals with those of the EU’s main global partners 
continues to be a challenge due to differences in democratic values, threat perception as well as 
priorities. Nevertheless, an effective multilateral and multidimensional diplomacy is the only way 
to strike a balance between the EU’s fundamental values and global security. Lastly, the efforts 
aimed at bridging the gaps resulting from the EU’s internal/external divide and the multiple levels 
of governance in counter-terrorism policies should not materialise only in an ad hoc fashion after 
a terrorist event, but should be translated into a comprehensive policy based on select areas of 
cooperation and prevention foresight.  
 
 
Beatrice Berton is a Researcher at the Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime. She had 
previously worked at the European Counter Terrorism Centre of Europol. 
  
                                                          
40 M. Fink, Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and Human Rights Concerns Regarding ‘Technical Relationships’, 
Merkourios, Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, Volume 28/Issue 75, Article, 2012, pp. 20-35. 
41 F. Trauner, New kids on the CFSP block: the JHA agencies, Brief No. 7, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 
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Conclusion – Pathways for an Improved Multilateral EU Action 
 
Balazs Ujvari 
 
This collective publication has included six contributions from established analysts of European 
affairs. Each contributor was asked to elaborate what the focal point of the EU’s multilateral 
agenda should be over a five year horizon. This has resulted in three pieces looking at the EU’s 
relations with a particular country or a group of countries and three contributions focusing on the 
Union’s multilateral action in a certain policy area. The overarching conclusion emerging from this 
paper is threefold. 
 
First, cooperative relationships between the EU and key emerging powers (especially China) on the 
international stage will be increasingly of the essence. Against the backdrop of a gradually 
fragmenting global governance landscape, it appears all the more important for the EU to reach 
out to a much larger number of partners than before while acting in multilateral milieus. The EU’s 
protracted recovery from the 2008/2009 financial crisis combined with emerging powers’ new-
found assertive and proactive role in international policy-making necessitates an increasingly 
broad consensus in multilateral policy, embracing an increasingly diverse set of views. Focusing 
solely on the EU’s strategic partners will not be sufficient. The Union can only be successful in 
promoting its interests on the global stage if it has a proper grasp of the wide range of positions 
taken by its negotiating partners – not only individually but also as a bloc – as well as the interests 
underlying these stances. Depending on the policy area in question, the key partners for, and 
adversaries of the EU will change and can only be identified through adequate outreach activities 
in the run-up to multilateral negotiations.  When promoting counter-terrorism efforts globally, for 
example, the EU may need to cooperate especially with North African and Middle Eastern 
countries along with the United States, while the championing of global climate regime will 
demand more outreach towards the rapidly industrialising and growing nations of Asia.  
 
Second, in approaching multilateral affairs, the EU needs to demonstrate innovative thinking and 
embrace the changing nature of international affairs. Rather than clinging on the traditional formal 
institutions, the EU member states would benefit from adopting a more flexible attitude. As a first 
step, this could entail the joint assessment of the recent wave of China- and BRICS-led international 
organisations, which have the potential of shaping the orthodox policy discourse in areas such as 
poverty reduction by drawing on the positive domestic experiences of its founders. Furthermore, 
it will be increasingly inevitable for the Union to shift its perceptions with respect to emerging and 
developing countries and regard them as equal partners instead of considering its relationship with 
them as a one-way street. By according more attention to what Europeans can learn from Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, for example, the EU will also stand a better chance of securing 
their diplomatic support when advancing its objectives in multilateral fora. Moreover, in acting on 
the international stage, the EU could also benefit from drawing on a so far unorthodox mixture of 
policies: a closer integration of scientific knowledge, for instance, with security and trade policy 
considerations, as suggested by Van Langenhove, could considerably enhance the EU’s ability to 
remain at the cutting edge and pull the strings in these domains internationally.   
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Finally, as the foremost embodiment of multilateralism, the EU must maintain its ambition in 
pursuing multilateral solutions.  The fact remains that the Union is best off in a world that functions 
in a similar way as the EU itself. This does not mean, however, that the 28-country bloc must 
necessarily call for legally binding international agreements through formal institutions with the 
broadest membership possible across the board – as the ESS of 2003 may have envisaged. The 
solution of global or regional issues will increasingly shift from traditional institutions to more 
informal networks and ad hoc coalitions, and this is not all bad news for Europeans. The EU needs 
not necessarily to compromise on its ambitious proposals but rather to make an informed choice 
as to the multilateral/plurilateral platform where it seeks to advance its agenda. In Stang’s words, 
multilateral projects could continue to be ‘driven’ by the EU but should not necessarily be ‘defined’ 
by the EU. Building on this first mover advantage, the right choice of platform and the involvement 
of the stakeholders affected most directly by the issue at hand, the EU will continue to stand a 
good chance of securing support for its multilateral actions – however ambitious they be.   
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